BY NATOSHA HODUSKI
While another round of negotiations on the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) began this week, looking back at the decade of failed negotiations between the three major riparian states - Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt - may offer us insight into the future of the Nile River basin. Negotiations between the three states on the use of the Blue Nile have been characterized by a complex process of trilateral negotiation and international mediation, consistently concluding with Ethiopia withdrawing before a substantive agreement can be reached.
Ethiopia's construction of the GERD has the potential to change the current flow regime of the Nile, a crucial source of water for both Egypt and Sudan. Fears of even minor changes in the availability of an already overloaded river system have brought all three riparian states to the negotiating table time and again. For Ethiopia, a major stumbling block is the unbalanced use of the river. The Blue Nile is the main tributary of the Nile River and up to 85 percent of its waters originate in Ethiopia. 1 Despite this fact, Ethiopia uses only 1 percent of the river. 2 The last twenty years have witnessed major droughts that devastated the country, causing desertification and water shortages; only 49 percent of Ethiopians have constant access to clean water. 3 Still, the country relies on groundwater for 70-90 percent of its domestic and industrial use and has historically been limited by international law to significantly develop, use, or alter the waters of the Blue Nile. 4
The legacy of the asymmetric allocation of the river dates back almost a century to the Anglo-Egyptian agreements of 1929 that handed over almost all of the Nile's waters to Egypt and Sudan. This agreement and subsequent bilateral negotiations in 1959 outlined consumer rights (55.5 billion cubic meters [bcm] to Egypt and 18.5 bcm to Sudan, almost 90 percent of the total 84 bcm flow from the Nile) that excluded the others. eight Nile riparian states. These agreements left upstream states without any institutionalized rights to river waters, regardless of point of origin or domestic demand within those states.
Ethiopia views the history of limitations in its ability to consume even a fraction of the waters that originate within its borders as an infringement of its own sovereignty. The combination of Ethiopia's upstream riparian position and the construction of the GERD offer Ethiopia the ability to greatly regulate the flow of river waters, strengthening its production-based river utilization claims. Construction of the dam itself was done without consulting Sudan or Egypt, and no negotiations on the fill rate were reached last year before Ethiopia began its first year confiscating river waters in the GERD reservoir. 5 In fact, almost every step of the dam's construction and negotiation has been used as a means for Ethiopia to regain sovereignty and self-determination in the region, betting that neither Egypt nor Sudan will seek military options to return the region to a situation of stagnation. that favors them asymmetrically. From Addis Ababa's perspective, GERD is a way of affirming the country's influence in the region and has become both a source of pride and a symbol of Ethiopia's future. Construction of the fully self-financed $ 5 billion (USD) dam is projected to be the lynchpin of Ethiopia's economic transformation.
Currently, 65 percent of Ethiopians are not connected to the country's electricity grid and do not have constant access to electricity; this insufficient access has historically posed serious barriers to national development. Once the filling of the GERD reservoir is complete, it is projected to have a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters (about 1.2 times the total annual flow of the Nile), and will be able to supply the country with hydroelectric power even in periods of drought. The dam is expected to create up to 12.000 jobs and will be the largest hydroelectric plant in Africa, supplying Ethiopia with up to 6,45 gigawatts of power, enough to supply electricity to all its citizens with enough surplus to export to neighboring countries.
Egypt views GERD as a threat not only to its hydro-hegemony in the region, but also to its ability to support its citizens who are almost entirely dependent on the river for fresh water. The Nile River supplies up to 97 percent of Egypt's fresh water, which means that it is highly susceptible to fluctuations in supply. Of the 55,5 bcm of the Nile allocated to Egypt, only 4 bcm flows into the Mediterranean Sea each year, which means that the country consumes 93 percent of its annual allocation. With plans to further expand the agricultural sector, 6 not even fully utilizing its allocation of river waters will be enough to meet Egypt's growing demand. 7
Egypt has a long history of meeting any threat to its hydro-hegemonic control of the river with open hostility, often accompanied by threats of military intervention. In 1980, former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat declared: "Any action that endangers the waters of the Blue Nile will meet a strong reaction from Egypt, even if that action leads to war." 8 While incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has publicly taken a softer stance in his approach to the negotiations, 9 Yohannes Woldemariam, an expert on the Horn of Africa, does not completely rule out conflict between nations. While he admits that the likelihood of open warfare between the states is unlikely, Ethiopia's growing intrastate conflict may provide the very real possibility for Egypt to become involved through a power. 10 Sudan's position on GERD is no different than Egypt's. Sudan's Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Yasser Abbas stated that the upcoming filling of the dam starting in June could pose a direct threat to Sudan's security. 11
After a decade of frustrations and deadlocks in negotiations, the decision on how fast the GERD reservoir will be filled remains unresolved. Ethiopia withdrew from US-brokered negotiations with Egypt and Sudan last year, despite former US President Donald Trump's decision to directly link US aid to Ethiopia with the country's willingness to cooperate during the Nile River negotiations. 12 In September 2020, Trump made good on his threat, resulting in a cumulative loss of approximately $ 100 million in aid, 13 although the current president of the United States, Joe Biden, has reversed the decision since then. 14
Recognizing the need for external intervention on their behalf to reach an agreement, in March, Cairo and Khartoum jointly requested the intervention of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and the African Union to help mediate on the issue; But after a decade of deadlock tactics and failed negotiations, Ethiopia is poised to begin seizing the waters of the Blue Nile for the second time this summer. It began filling the dam during the rainy season last year, seizing about 4,9 bcm of water. 15 It has since issued a statement stating that it aims to seize 13,5 bcm in 2021, regardless of whether an agreement is reached on the allocation of the river. 16 Egypt has openly opposed this plan; Prime Minister Madbouly addressed the UNGA on March 18 and said: “The second filling of the dam contravenes international obligations and agreements. The second filling of the Renaissance Dam threatens to inflict serious damage on the interests of Egypt and Sudan. " 17 This has left the two countries with few diplomatic options to force Ethiopia to comply.
In the last decade, Ethiopia has delayed, withdrew or demanded the renegotiation of all major attempts to reach an agreement between the three parties. If and when the three countries reach a consensus, Ethiopia will be legally constrained by the agreement, a situation that will drastically restrict its unilateral execution of future infrastructure projects and curb its ability to consume water that originates within its borders. Meanwhile, the negotiations are increasingly seen not only as a ploy to achieve a better negotiating position or to reach an agreement that it considers more equitable, but as a tactic Ethiopia is using to redistribute de facto power and resources in a region that has historically been dominated by Egypt for the better part of a century. Consensus on the dam is unlikely to be reached before it fills up this summer. Indeed, until most of the GERD reservoir is filled, Ethiopia has limited motivation to make meaningful bargaining concessions and much to gain by continuing to postpone the deal.
FINAL NOTES
1 Wheeler, KG, Jeuland, M., Hall, JW et al (2020) 'Understanding and managing new risks on the Nile with the Great Dam of the Ethiopian Renaissance'. Nat Commun 11, 5222 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19089-x
2 Yihdego, Zeray. (2017) 'The “dilemma” of equity in sharing the waters of the Nile: What lessons from the great dam of the Ethiopian Renaissance for international law?' Brill Research Perspectives in International Law, Vol 2 (2), pp. 1-80 https://brill.com/view/journals/rpwl/2/2/article-p1_1.xml?language=en
3 Shore, Rebecca (2016) "Water In Crisis - Spotlight Ethiopia". The water project. The Water Project, nd Web. May 01, 2016.
4 Grönwall, J. and Danert, K. (2020). "Regarding access to groundwater and drinking water through a human rights lens: self-sufficiency as the norm." Water, vol. 12 (2). doi: 10.3390 / w12020419, p. two
5 Seizure is defined as the accumulation of water in a reservoir for immediate or future use.
6 Egypt's agricultural sector makes up 11 percent of its GDP, and despite having drawn up a plan to become self-sufficient in wheat by 2030 (Egypt is currently the world's largest wheat importer), self-sufficiency is unlikely to be possible. get long term. -finished. Plans to double the state's irrigated land to achieve this goal will dramatically increase demand for irrigation water from 6 bcm to 29 bcm if its wheat self-sufficiency goals try to keep up with its expanding population and projected changes in the Egypt's climate in the next 15 to 20 years.
Asseng, Senthold; Khier, Ahmed MS; Kassie, Belay T; Hoogenboom, Gerrit; Abdelaal, Aly IN; Amman, Dorota Z; Ruane, Alex C, (2018) 'Can Egypt become self-sufficient in wheat?' Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 13 (9), pp. 1-11 https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aada50
7 Ibid.
8 Kendie, Daniel (1999). Egypt and the hydropolitics of the Blue Nile river. Northeast African Studies, 6 (1/2), new series, 141-169, p. 141. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41931230
9 Sisi publicly denounced Ethiopia's fait accompli regarding the Nile, but has not publicly threatened violence.
10 Woldemariam, Johannes. (2020) 'Military showdown in Ethiopia, Trump and the geopolitics of the dam' London School of Economics blog November 17, 2020 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/11/17/military -confrontation- war-ethiopia-trump-and-geopolitics-dams-gerd /
11 Al-Jazeera (2021) 'Sudan's minister warns Ethiopia against filling the dam without agreement', al-Jazeera, February 2, 2021 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/2 / sudan-minister-warns -ethiopia-filling-mega-dam-no-deal
12 Leaked documents from US mediation efforts indicated that Ethiopia would like to fill the dam in 4-7 years with a designated release rate of at least 31 bcm / year to downstream states. Egypt maintains that the filling should extend for 10-15 years and Egypt should be guaranteed a release of 40 bcm / year. Later, the United States offered 37 bcm / year as a commitment. (Kimenyi, Mwangi; Mbaku, John)
13 Solomon, Salem. (2021) 'American Restoration of Aid to Ethiopia Points a New Direction' VOA News, February 25, 2021 https://www.voanews.com/africa/us-restoration-foreign-aid-ethiopia-signals -new-course
14 Ibid.
15 Wheeler, KG, Jeuland, M., Hall, JW et al (2020) 'Understanding and managing new risks on the Nile with the Great Dam of the Ethiopian Renaissance'. Nat Commun 11, 5222 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19089-x
16 Davies, Jack. (2021) Human Security Center 'The Control of Water as a Driver of Stability', Africa http://www.hscentre.org/africa/the-control-of-water-as-a-driver-of-instability/
17 Hassanan-Tayea. (2021) 'Madbouly Voices Egypt Concern over Dam to UN General Assembly' Sada el-Balad English March 18, 2021 https://see.news/madbouly-voices-egypts-concern-over-gerd-to-un-general /